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G. USE OF THE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCT

1. WHAT UNILATERAL OPERATIONAL USE DID THE AGENCY MAKE OF INTELLIGENCE OR INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION RECEIVED ON THE BUILD-UP?

During the period in question DIA effected re-alignment of resources within the Current Intelligence and Indication Center and within the Office of Estimates in order to provide adequate manning and coverage of all sources of information. Around-the-clock effort was stepped up within the Current Intelligence and Indications Center. Within the Estimates Office additional personnel were assigned to the Latin American Division and a temporary special group was established to cope with all source materials required by estimators in both the Latin American and Soviet Bloc divisions. Ultimately DIA set up a special Cuban situation room on 4 October bringing together the pertinent specialists from CI/IC and from the Estimates Office. This twenty-four hour operation is still underway.

The products of this re-alignment of resources are set forth elsewhere. (See particularly 4. below.) Similarly the liaison with collection resources and the interchange between analysts within the components of DIA and with the analysts of other agencies is elsewhere described.

While interest and concern over Cuba was relatively high throughout the period beginning in April, the requirements for such intelligence reporting began growing during mid-August and have accelerated continuously since that time. Since mid-September DIA has been fulfilling an average of 15-20 cable and 35-45 telephonic requests each week for intelligence on the Cuban situation from the Unified and Specified commands engaged in contingency planning. Many of these requests have been easily satisfied, but a good number have required considerable work. A further complication, elsewhere discussed in detail (see H.4), occurred through rigid control of "need to know". Simultaneously, the demands for intelligence support on Cuba within the DOD and Joint Staff increased enormously. Many extra briefings and informal planning sessions at which Intelligence personnel were required to attend have been and continue to be required.

In this latter connection it should be noted that the Director of DIA was in close personal, nearly daily, contact during the period under review with the Secretary of Defense, his principal assistants, and with the JCS and their principal assistants, providing details on the inflow of information from all sources and counsel in evaluations of this material.

DIA review(s) completed.

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2. HOW WAS SUCH INFORMATION OR INTELLIGENCE USED BY THE DIA IN PARTICIPATION IN COMMUNITY MEETINGS (USIB, SPECIAL GROUP, WATCH COMMITTEE, NRO (S), OTHERS)?

DIA participation in the community groups most directly concerned with Cuba during the period under review, specifically COMOR, NRO(S), Special Group, CCPC, is detailed in Section A. In addition, DIA participated in Watch Committee deliberations in which the Cuba situation was touched upon from time to time. The records of this organization are available in CIA. It is noted that during the period under review the Watch Committee report contains three conclusions concerning Cuba, specifically on 29 August, 6 September and 13 September. During the same period these reports contain "backup" material on Cuba on eight occasions. DIA provided the military intelligence input upon which these backup reports and conclusions were based.

Insofar as DIA was concerned, such committees as JAEIC and GMAIC were not involved with the Cuban problem during the period under review. USIB itself, as the parent organization, reviewed the conclusions of the Watch Committee and was concerned with the operations and recommendations of other committees directly within its purview, and acted as a body on many occasions concerning Cuban matters made known to it by other organizations such as the Special Group, the NRO (S), etc.

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3. HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT DID THE AGENCY CONTRIBUTE TO COORDINATED ACTION (POLICY) BY THE COMMUNITY OR MEMBERS THEREOF AS A RESULT OF INTELLIGENCE RECEIVED DURING THE BUILD-UP?

The detailed mechanism of the intelligence community for providing coordinated estimative views to the policy makers is elsewhere set forth (see Section E). During the period under review and with respect to Cuba, DIA participated in all pertinent groups organized under USIB, including COMOR, CCPC, etc., in establishing and coordinating requirements for the acquisition of additional intelligence.

As a specific example, a 1 October DIA analysis of SA-2 site disposition together with a review of defector/refugee reports led to a DIA recommendation to COMOR on 3 October that emphasis be placed on photographic coverage of the Pinar del Rio area in the reconnaissance objectives list. The San Cristobal MRBM complex was discovered in this area on 14 October.

The DIA evaluation referred to above, together with the reports received in DIA on 20 and 21 September, respectively, concerning statements attributed to Castro's personal pilot and concerning the refugee's sighting of MRBMs in the vicinity of Campo Libertad, provided additional impetus to the determination of need for high resolution photographic coverage of Cuba. It also emphasized again the need for a programmed coverage over all known and suspect reconnaissance objectives in Cuba. Approval for a U-2 overflight program directed against our standing requirements, would provide coverage of most of the land mass of the Island of Cuba because of the relatively broad coverage obtained through the use of the U-2 camera systems.

The DIA proposal was translated into two separate actions; the first being in the form of a memorandum for the United States Intelligence Board (USIB-D-41.5/25 of 5 October 1962) and the second being a similar memorandum (USIB-D-41.5/26 of 6 October 1962) which enclosed a copy of the COMOR intelligence justification and requirements for overflight of Cuba to the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office (S) at his specific request. The narrative for the basic justification in both of these USIB documents reflects very few changes or omissions from the form in which it was submitted by DIA on 3 October.

In summary it was DIA action which instigated COMOR considerations of revised overflights of Cuba and the text of the presentation submitted to both USIB and the special group was predicated on the 3 October DIA submission. The proposed draft which DIA submitted for COMOR approval included recognition of the increased risk to overflight aircraft posed by surface-to-air missiles and MIG-21 aircraft and was followed by the statement:

"But it must be stated that the current need is extremely urgent, and the risk involved should be very thoroughly weighed before this coverage is denied."

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